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.For as the ideas of pleasure can have aninfluence only by means of their vivacity, which makes them approachimpressions, `tis most natural those ideas shou'd have that influence,which are favour'd by most circumstances, and have a natural tendencyto become strong and lively; such as our ideas of the passions andsensations of any human creature.Every human creature resemblesourselves, and by that means has an advantage above any other object, inoperating on the imagination.Besides, if we consider the nature of that faculty, and the great influencewhich all relations have upon it, we shall easily be persuaded, thathowever the ideas of the pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which therich man enjoys, may become lively and agreeable, the fancy will notconfine itself to them, but will carry its view to the related objects; and inparticular, to the person, who possesses them.And this is the morenatural, that the pleasant idea or image produces here a passion towardsthe person, by means of his relation to the object; so that `tis unavoidablebut he must enter into the original conception, since he makes the objectof the derivative passion: But if he enters into the original conception,and is consider'd as enjoying these agreeable objects, `tis sympathy, which is properly the cause of the affection; and the third principle ismore powerful and universal than the first.Add to this, that riches and power alone, even tho' unemploy'd, naturallycause esteem and respect: And consequently these passions arise notfrom the idea of any beautiful or agreeable objects.Tis true; moneyimplies a kind of representation of such objects, by the power it affordsof obtaining them; and for that reason may still be esteem'd proper toconvey those agreeable images, which may give rise to the passion.Butas this prospect is very distant, `tis more natural for us to take acontiguous object, viz, the satisfaction, which this power affords theperson, who is possest of it.And of this we shall be farther satisfy'd, if weconsider, that riches represent the goods of life, only by means of thewill; which employs them; and therefore imply in their very nature anidea of the person, and cannot be consider'd without a kind of sympathywith his sensations and enjoyments.This we may confirm by a reflection, which to some will, perhaps, appeartoo subtile and refin'd.I have already observ'd, that power, asdistinguish'd from its exercise, has either no meaning at all, or is nothingbut a possibility or probability of existence; by which any objectapproaches to reality, and has a sensible influence on the mind.I havealso observ'd, that this approach, by an illusion of the fancy, appearsmuch greater, when we ourselves are possest of the power, than when itis enjoy'd by another; and that in the former case the objects seem totouch upon the very verge of reality, and convey almost an equalsatisfaction, as if actually in our possession.Now I assert, that where weesteem a person upon account of his riches, we must enter into thissentiment of the proprietor, and that without such a sympathy the idea ofthe agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, wou'dhave but a feeble influence upon us.An avaritious man is respected forhis money, tho' he scarce is possest of a power; that is, there scarce is aprobability or even possibility of his employing it in the acquisition of thepleasures and conveniences of life.To himself alone this power seemsperfect and entire; and therefore we must receive his sentiments bysympathy, before we can have a strong intense idea of these enjoyments,or esteem him upon account of them.Thus we have found, that the first principle, viz, the agreeable idea ofthose objects, which riches afford the enjoyment of; resolves itself in agreat measure into the third, and becomes a sympathy with the person we esteem or love.Let us now examine the second principle, viz, theagreeable expectation of advantage, and see what force we may justlyattribute to it.`Tis obvious, that tho' riches and authority undoubtedly give their ownera power of doing us service, yet this power is not to be consider'd as onthe same footing with that, which they afford him, of pleasing himself,and satisfying his own appetites.Self-love approaches the power andexercise very near each other in the latter case; but in order to produce asimilar effect in the former, we must suppose a friendship and good-willto be conjoin'd with the riches.Without that circumstance `tis difficult toconceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches ofothers, tho' there is nothing more certain, than that we naturally esteemand respect the rich, even before we discover in them any suchfavourable disposition towards us.But I carry this farther, and observe, not only that we respect the rich andpowerful, where they shew no inclination to serve us, but also when welie so much out of the sphere of their activity, that they cannot even besuppos'd to be endow'd with that power.Prisoners of war are alwaystreated with a respect suitable to their condition; and `tis certain riches govery far towards fixing the condition of any person.If birth and qualityenter for a share, this still affords us an argument of the same kind
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