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.54 The Bear River MassacreConnor s secret preparations were obvious to locals, who had alsoheard his recent promise to  exterminate the natives who werekilling overlanders.On January 22, 1863, in a heavy snowstorm, Captain Samuel W.Hoyt left Camp Douglas with seventy-two men from K Company,Third Infantry Regiment; a detachment of twelve cavalry; fifteen bag-gage wagons carrying a twenty-day supply of rations; and two how-itzers with one hundred shells.It was said that they were marching toescort a wagon train moving grain in Cache Valley.On January 24,Connor moved out with 220 men from Companies A, H, K, and M,Second Cavalry.His ration orders for the cavalry alone totaled an as-tounding sixteen thousand rounds of ammunition for rifles and pis-tols.The plan was to march through the night to a rendezvous withthe infantry, to attack the Shoshone at Bear River.The exit from Salt Lake City must have been impressive, if quiet.On January 28, the Deseret News crowed that the Union-affiliatedtroops would  wipe them out (qtd.in Madsen 180).Hoyt s march was slow: 13 miles the first day, then 25, then 18,then 14, then 25.Their route was to the Weber River, then to Willard,and then Mendon, where they awaited the cavalry.On January 28,Corporal Hiram G.Tuttle s diary records that they  left camp 12 atnight, went 34 miles to Franklin and camped, arriving at 5 P.M.(qtd.in Madsen 180).The march took place during what must have been, had recordsbeen kept, a record-making cold snap in the region.It was so bit-terly cold that the whiskey rations froze in canteens.The cavalry,who rode 68 miles their first night out, arrived in Brigham Citywith their feet frozen in stirrups, and (as reported in the San Fran-cisco Bulletin)  whiskers and moustache.so chained together byice that opening the mouth became most difficult (qtd.in Madsen182).There was a foot of snow in the Salt Lake valley, and four feeton the divide between Brigham City and Cache Valley.Moving thehowitzers was a daunting challenge, and seventy-five cavalrymenwere abandoned at Mormon settlements with frozen feet.As Mad-sen notes,  Fighting Indians in midwinter at below zero tempera-tures was an unusual experience in United States military history,but Connor never wavered (182).Famed Mormon guide Orrin Porter Rockwell had been engagedby Connor for $5 a day; Rockwell warned Connor that the Shoshonewere ready and waiting and had built entrenchments at the camp.What (We Think) Happened 55Connor expected six hundred warriors manning rifle pits behindbreastworks to defend what he knew to be seventy-five lodges.ThusMadsen disputes Connor s calculation of his opposition as a vastoverestimation one of which Connor was probably conscious.Atan average of six persons per lodge, seventy-five lodges could typi-cally hold only 450 people altogether; therefore, Madsen estimatesthat there were fewer than 200 warriors present.And Rockwell s as-sessment of Shoshone intentions was also not credible.A miner onthe road to Salt Lake City reported talking to some Cache ValleyShoshone who told him they would not harass the settlers further butintended only to continue to exact revenge from white travelers forMcGarry s actions.In Franklin, just before the troops arrived, Bishop PrestonThomas ordered nine bushels of wheat be given to three Shoshonesent by Bear Hunter.William Hull complied, taking the opportunityto taunt the Shoshone about the approach of soldiers, whom theShoshone called  Toquash.  We had two of the three horsesloaded, having put three bushels on each horse.when I looked upand saw the Soldiers approaching from the south.I said to the In-dian boys,  Here comes the Toquashes maybe, you will all be killed.They answered  maybe Toquashes be killed too, but not waiting forthe third horse to be loaded, they quickly jumped upon their horsesand led the three horses away, disappearing in the distance (qtd.inMadsen 183).Bear Hunter may also have visited town that day totrade.Thus it is clear that the Northwestern Shoshoni were warnedabout the presence of the infantry.But Madsen points out that theyprobably did not know about the cavalry, and could have knownneither the full extent of the party sent to march against them, nor oftheir new intentions.Connor ordered Hoyt to move out with the infantry, the how-itzers, and the wagon train at 1:00 A.M.But he was at first unable tofind a local guide to lead him to the Shoshone camp.Mormon lead-ers finally  counseled Edmond and Joseph S.Nelson of Franklin toaccompany Hoyt (such is the term used by the Franklin County Citi-zen; qtd.in Madsen 183).They set out after 3:00 A.M., two hours late.The infantry was also delayed by the equipment, and, as Madsensays,  wished they could have traded their wagons for the sleighsknowledgeable Mormon settlers used for winter transportation inCache Valley (183).56 The Bear River MassacreMercifully, the howitzers were abandoned six miles from the river.Connor left with the cavalry at 4:00 A.M., catching up with Hoytfour miles from the river.Madsen believes that Major McGarry and the first cavalrytroops reached the bluffs overlooking Bear River  at 6:00 a.m [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]