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.Thus the beliefs that make up astronomicalknowledge do not just concern the facts of cosmology.They are mediatedby the perspective afforded by the telescope (and its successors), and theyare now unthinkable without it.In religion, the class in question would be the class of believers, althoughwhat class that is will depend on the specificity of the issue in question.Disputes concerning papal infallibility tend to include only Catholics (thoughothers may readily voice their irrelevant opinions), while arguments con-cerning “who’s a Jew” will include mainly Jews, Israeli politicians, and(sadly) anti-Semites.Questions about the divinity of Christ will naturallyinclude virtually every Christian, while Nietzsche’s ad hominem argumentsagainst the Judeo-Christian tradition presuppose a certain antagonistic stancethat understandably tends to alienate and offend believers.But also—andthis is the critical point—such antagonistic arguments against the Judeo-Christian tradition come from within that tradition.It is not a matter of ironic coincidence that Nietzsche’s father was a Lutheran minister and that LIVING WITH NIETZSCHENietzsche himself grew up thinking he was bound for the ministry.It is almost impossible to imagine Nietzsche’s rage (as well as his insider’sknowledge) if he were not attacking and trying to work his way out of hisown childhood perspective.Thus when Nietzsche comments that he is anatheist “by instinct” in his autobiography, this should be taken as disingen-uous and ironic, at best. One does not find such vicious atheists in the foxholes of mere unbelievers.So, too, all questions of morality depend on one’s belonging to a culture.(Claude Levi-Strauss: “When I witness certain decisions or modes of behav-ior in my own society, I am filled with indignation and disgust, whereas ifI observe similar behavior in a so-called primitive society, I make no attemptat a value judgment.I attempt to understand it.”) If there are any universal rules or principles of morality, it is because we share a common context,minimally, the context of being “human.” (The charge of what Peter Singercalls “speciesism” looms here, an exaggerated estimation of the importanceof human interests and a neglect of the interests of other species. Nietzsche would be very sympathetic to such a charge.) Morality depends upon context, and whether or not there are universal rules or principles of morality,one’s view of what is and ought to be will depend on one’s particular cul-ture, background and experience, one’s family and friends, one’s class, one’shealth and financial position.So too more generally, the search for truth inphilosophy depends on one’s abilities, one’s approach, and one’s viewpoint.The continuing search for a “method” in philosophy reflects the perennialdesire for some definitive perspective yielding direct access to the issues,but the proliferation of such methods (phenomenological and analytic, forexample) only underscores the evident fact that philosophies differ as peopleand perspectives differ.Who one is (in the relevant sense) is a definitive (though not sufficient) determinant of philosophical results. “Methods” are often post hoc means of confirmation.In other words, Nietzsche’s use of ad hominem arguments has verymuch to do with his much-debated “perspectivism.” That is, his view thatone always knows or perceives or thinks about something from a particular“perspective”—not just a spatial viewpoint, of course, but a particular con-text of surrounding impressions, influences and ideas, conceived of throughone’s language and social upbringing and, ultimately, determined by virtu-ally everything about oneself, one’s psychophysical make-up and one’s his-tory.Thus Nietzsche sometimes goes on record as insisting that perspectivesare strictly individual, indeed, that everyone’s perspective is “unique.” And in a somewhat trivial sense, this is true.No one else can be in exactly myspatial location at exactly the same time with exactly my background andexperience.Sometimes, indeed, Nietzsche even goes so far as to break per-spectives into moments, suggesting that each of us is many selves and dif-ferent selves may have different perspectives.Or, perhaps we have no selvesat all but we are only these momentary perspectives, now seeing the world this way (e.g., when we are angry), now that way (e.g., when we are fallingN I E T Z S C H E A D H O M I N E Min love).But I think that breaking things down so far robs the general thesis of its real strength, which is to insist that there is no perspective-free, global viewpoint, no “God’s eye” view, only this or that more or less particularperspective.Ad hominen arguments have some validity because there is nosuch thing as an idea or a truth that does not come from somewhere andfrom someone.This thesis has often been turned into Nietzsche’s supposed “doctrine” of“perspectivism,” (a term he uses just once).There is, according to this doc-trine, no external comparison or correspondence to be made between whatwe believe and truth “in itself” but only the comparison, competition anddifferences in quality within and between the perspectives themselves.Asthe charge that an ad hominem argument is a fallacy turns on this rejectedassumption, that there is such a ready distinction and available comparisonbetween what we believe and truth “in itself,” Nietzsche’s perspectivismwould be a defense of his ad hominem method.The perspectivism metaphor (and it is a metaphor) actually leaves openthe question of whether there is or might be some “truth in itself,” whichis the ultimate (even if never “unmediated”) object of all perspectives
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