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.Theeffect of ABM deployment is difficult to gauge because so much depends firstly onthe degree to which vulnerability is thereby reduced and secondly upon the judgementmade on this point by potential adversaries;(c) it seems unlikely that the deployment of ABMs by one side or the other wouldoverthrow the balance of deterrence.Nevertheless, it might tilt it and thus increasetension and instability.(d) in any event it would intensify the arms race and make nuclear disarmament harder;(e) the degree to which Europe would be adversely affected would depend upon the scaleand effectiveness of the Russian and American deployment, but in any event thedisparity between Europe and the two super-powers would be increased to thedisadvantage of Europe;(f) the introduction of an American ABM system without adequate allied consultationwould strengthen the hand of the Gaullists and would be unhealthy for the AtlanticAlliance.ABMs create an additional need for practical measures of Atlanticcooperation, such as more closely integrated Atlantic forces;(g) the best argument for the deployment of ABMs is the great effect it would have inlimiting damage in a nuclear war with China; but such a war is not at present on thecards and in the long run China will seek to match whatever America and Russia do;(h) in these circumstances the balance of advantage for Britain seems to be in 120deployment of ABMs; logically this is also in the interest of the United States andRussia and although it may be very difficult to achieve we should on the basis ofpresent information aim to bring about a Russian-American understanding not todeploy ABMs;(i) the next step should be exploratory talks with the Americans; in the light of this wecan take a decision on whether, and if so how, to try to influence their policy.26The Steering Committee, chaired by the Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) Gore-Booth,agreed that the issue was both important and urgent, and that early discussions with theAmericans were required.27 The Ministries of Defence and Aviation were bothapproached at PUS level in order to coordinate an approach to the Americans.28 This Britain and ballistic missile defence 1942 2002 102revealed to the Foreign Office for the first time the extent of British technical researchinto ABM, and cooperation with the United States.The Foreign Office concluded thatthere was a gap in our liaison and that in future they should be more closely involved ina matter with obvious political implications.29On 12 August the British Ambassador in Washington had a preliminary meeting withDean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, indicating just how important the matter wasregarded in London.Rusk appeared to be no more aware of technical exchanges than hadbeen the Foreign Office.He emphasised that US thinking on the subject was stillinconclusive.30A brief prepared by the Planning Staff queried how large a so-called thin defencewould need to be to counter about 20 Chinese ICBMs, a remarkably accurate guess as 35years later the Chinese strategic arsenal was just such a size.31 The paper stated:The general point to stress to the Americans is that on the face of it wethink that a decision on the operational deployment of ABMs could have abig influence on our future well-being and security and that accordinglywe should like to explore the whole question with them objectively andwithout commitment.32Sir Solly Zuckerman, the MoD s Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) advised Gore-Booththat ABMs had been a continuing topic of conversation with the Pentagon for manyyears.He also observed: I do not rate our chances of being able to influence theAmericans too highly. 33 The MoD Deputy Under-Secretary, Leitch, confirmed theselinks and stressed that they should not be prejudiced by discussions on a delicatesubject.34 The MoD was concerned that a probably futile attempt by the Foreign Officeto influence US policy might disrupt their own close working relationships with theAmericans
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